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RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
This RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING is submitted by the 
Division of Securities (hereinafter the "Division") and the 
Department of Commerce of the State of Utahf Respondents in this 
appeal, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and at the specific request of the Court. 
The Respondents believe that the Court made a minor error in 
citing Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-12 on page 8 of its opinion 
of November 29, 1991 (hereinafter the "Opinion"). The Respondents 
believe that the Court meant to cite to Utah Code Annotated section 
61-1-14(3). Otherwise, the Respondents believe that the Opinion 
correctly resolves all of the issues raised in this appeal. 
I. THE COURT INCORRECTLY CITED TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 
61-1-12 ON PAGE 8 OF THE OPINION, BUT THAT ERROR DOES NOT AFFECT 
THE VALIDITY OF THE OPINION BECAUSE A STOP TRADING ORDER UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 61-1-14(3) IS FUNCTIONALLY THE 
EQUIVALENT OF ONE UNDER SECTION 61-1-12. 
The second paragraph of page 8 of the Opinion includes two 
references to Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-12 (1989).1 The 
Court implies that the stop trading order was issued under section 
12. That is incorrect. The stop trading order in this case was 
!Contrary to the Petitioners' assertions in their Petition for 
Rehearing, the remainder of the Opinion appears to be based 
correctly on section 14(3). The only references to section 12 are 
those contained on page 8; other references in the Opinion to the 
stop trading order correctly identify it as a section 14(3) order. 
See, e.g., Opinion at 16, 18 (quoting the Division's March 1, 1989 
stop trading order). 
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issued under Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14(3)(1989) .2 The 
Court's mistaken reference to section 12, rather than section 
14(3), on page 8 of the Opinion does not affect the analysis of the 
case, however. The Opinion states that 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-12 (1989) grants the executive 
director blanket authority to issue a stop order in 
several enumerated circumstances. In addition, Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-12(2)(C)(i) (1989) states: "If no hearing is 
requested and none is ordered by the division or 
executive director, the order shall remain in effect 
until it is modified or vacated by the executive 
director." By its plain language, the statute grants 
broad discretionary powers to the executive director to 
either call for a hearing, modify or leave in effect the 
stop trading order that has been entered. 
The same can be said for stop trading orders issued under section 
14(3). Section 14(3) gives the director the authority to stop 
trading in an unregistered security by revoking or denying the 
effectiveness and availability of exemptions from the registration 
requirements. (As the Opinion correctly notes on page 14, "[s]ince 
the stock was unregistered and was not eligible for any exemptions 
to registration, it could not lawfully be the subject of any 
transaction.") Likewise, section 14(3) includes the following 
language, which is almost identical to the language from section 12 
quoted in the Opinion: "If no hearing is requested and none is 
ordered by the executive director or division, the order will 
2There are a number of differences between section 12 and 
section 14(3) stop trading orders, as explained in the Brief of 
Respondents at pages 42-44, but the main difference is that section 
12 stop trading orders are issued when a company has registered 
with the Utah Division of Securities, while section 14(3) stop 
trading orders are issued when a company has not registered, but is 
trading on the basis of an alleged exemption from the registration 
requirements. 
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remain in effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive 
director." U.C.A. § 61-1-14(3)(1989). Thus, the Opinion's 
analysis on page 8 that section 12 "grants broad discretionary 
powers to the executive director to either call for a hearing, 
modify or leave in effect the stop trading order that has been 
entered" applies equally well to section 14(3) stop trading 
orders.3 
In short, while a minor amendment to the Opinion would be 
appropriate, replacing the page 8 references to section 12 with 
references to section 14(3) and slightly altering the quote, the 
analysis contained in the Opinion remains valid with respect to 
section 14(3) stop trading orders such as the one in this case. 
II. THE JOHNSONS CONTINUE TO FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WERE 
SANCTIONED FOR ENGAGING IN DISHONEST AND UNETHICAL PRACTICES IN 
THE SECURITIES BUSINESS. 
The arguments raised in the remaining points of the Petition 
for Rehearing show that the Johnsons have never quite understood 
that they were administratively sanctioned for violating industry 
norms by engaging in dishonest and unethical practices in the 
securities business. The Johnsons continually try to shift burdens 
of proof, raise non-issues, and apply incorrect legal standards, 
leading the Respondents to wonder, inter alia, whether the Johnsons 
3For the record, it should be noted that while the Johnsons 
have made numerous arguments in their original briefs and in the 
Petition for Rehearing to the effect that the stop trading order is 
invalid or unconstitutional, they lack standing to raise those 
arguments. Although they were aware of the stop trading order on 
the day it was issued, they failed to either (1) object to it 
becoming permanent or (2) seek to have it modified or vacated. 
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think that they have been convicted of felonies, rather than having 
been temporarily denied the privilege of professional licensure. 
For example, Point II of the Petition for Rehearing, 
concerning whether a section 14(2) exemption is required for 
purchasing a security, fails to recognize that this is an 
administrative action based on unethical conduct. The scope of 
unethical conduct encompasses much more than merely that conduct 
which is not illegal. As this Court recently noted in Heinecke v. 
Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 466 (1991): 
In contrast to the unfairness in imposing criminal 
liability on a run-of-the-mill citizen under a statute 
which does not clearly proscribe the conduct complained 
of, as a result of their training, testing, and 
licensure, members of a profession are properly charged 
with knowledge of what conduct is inconsistent with their 
responsibilities as professionals notwithstanding some 
lack of precision or comprehensiveness in the statutes 
and rules governing their licensure." 
The record provides substantial evidence that the Johnsons 
knowingly engaged in conduct that was inconsistent with their 
responsibilities as professionals, even if the conduct was not 
civilly or criminally actionable. Among other things, the 
Securities Advisory Board had no trouble concluding that the 
Johnsons' purchase of U.S.A. Medical stock after the Division's 
March 1, 1989 stop trading order "frustrated the Division's 
appropriate efforts to preclude trading in those securities and 
thus partially emasculated the effect of the March 1, 1989 Order," 
Record, at page 1138. Such conduct by a professional, designed to 
subvert the professional's regulatory agency, is prima facie 
unethical. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the Johnsons were 
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to show that their purchases of stock were not illegal, they have 
not met their burden of showing that the Securities Advisory Board 
acted irrationally in determining that their behavior was 
unethical.A 
Likewise, the Johnsons are obsessed with attempting to prove 
(in Point III of the Petition for Rehearing) that they did not "aid 
and abet" a violation of the securities act, even though they were 
not sanctioned for having aided and abetted in the narrow legal 
sense of the term. While Count One of the Amended Petition brought 
against the Johnsons contains an assertion that the Johnsons' 
actions encouraged or aided violations of the law,5 Count Two 
contains no language about aiding. Record, at 165-167. The 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by the 
Securities Advisory Board against the Johnsons is based solely on 
the theory that the Johnsons had acted dishonestly and unethically 
by willfully violating the Division's stop trading order; there is 
not one mention of the Johnsons being censured for having "aided 
and abetted" a violation of law. Record, at 1129-1142. Thus, 
Point III of the Petition for Rehearing, concerning whether a mere 
A0f course, the Respondents do not concede for a second that 
the Johnsons' behavior was lawful. The Court's Opinion is correct 
when it states that " [s]ince the stock was unregistered and was not 
eligible for any exemptions to registration, it could not lawfully 
be the subject of any transaction." Opinion, at page 14. 
5The Johnsons have utterly failed to recognize, and therefor 
address, the fact that encouraging a violation of the securities 
laws could be deemed a dishonest and unethical practice even if it 
did not rise to the level of technical "aiding and abetting." 
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purchase of non-exempt stock6 is "aiding and abetting," is 
irrelevant.7 
In Point IV of the Petition for Rehearing, the Johnsons show 
that they do not understand their duty to first "marshall the 
evidence" before attacking the Division's administrative ruling. 
They assert that they did marshall the evidence because "all of the 
facts were stipulated to with the exception of Finding No. 14 . . 
Petition for Rehearing, at page 6. Not true. At least two of 
the most important facts supporting the Division's action were not 
contained in the Stipulation of Facts for Purposes of Hearing. 
Those facts are: (1) Judge Green's finding that Johnson-Bowles 
knew or should have known (and was chargeable with knowledge) of 
the illegal trading of the U.S.A. medical stock before the Johnsons 
sold short; and (2) the Johnsons' own damning letter of March 21, 
1989 to the NASD in which they themselves argue that "any trading 
of or transaction involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, would 
60f course, the Johnsons did more than merely purchase non-
exempt stock. They purchased stock in violation of a stop trading 
order. The Respondents believe that such a purchase constitutes 
both a direct violation of the law and aiding and abetting a 
violation by the seller. 
7Likewise irrelevant is the case of Jessup, Josephthal & Co. 
v. Piquet & Cie, cited in Counsel for Petitioners' letter to the 
Court of January 7, 1992. Even assuming, arguendo, that the 
present case involved an "aiding and abetting" theory, Jessup has 
nothing to do with whether a party can be administratively 
sanctioned for having aided another in violating the securities 
laws. Instead, it deals with the entirely different question of 
when a plaintiff in a civil action, who claims that the defendant 
was aiding and abetting a third party in committing securities 
fraud against the plaintiff, is barred by the doctrine of in pari 
delicto due to the plaintiff's own participation in the fraudulent 
scheme. 
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have been and is unlawful" even without reference to the Division's 
stop trading order. The Johnsons' briefs failed to marshall those 
facts or the other facts favorable to the Division before attacking 
the Division's actions. 
In all of their briefs, the Johnsons have utterly failed in 
their duty of showing that the Division's actions were irrational 
in light of the facts, such as those just mentioned, that favor the 
Division. Thus the Court was correct in declining to analyze many 
of the claims by the Johnsons that required a factual determination 
of the reasonableness of the Securities Advisory Board's actions. 
Point V of the Petition for Rehearing is a mere ad hominem 
attack on the Court, and as such it does not dignify any extended 
response.8 
The Respondents must admit that they do not fully understand 
Point VI of the Petition for Rehearing, which seems to indicate 
that the Johnsons think that the Opinion holds that they are guilty 
of dishonest and unethical behavior simply because they failed to 
prevail on their Rule 12 motions. The Johnsons claim that the 
Opinion does not explain why their behavior is dishonest and 
8Three brief points about selective enforcement with regard to 
the U.S.A. Medical stock fraud. First, several of the key 
participants have been convicted of federal or state felonies, and 
at least one is serving extended back to back federal and state 
prison sentences. Second, Susan Slattery's situation is factually 
very different from that of the Johnsons, and she obtained a 
specific "no action letter" from the division in advance which held 
that the Utah Division of Securities had no jurisdiction over the 
exclusively out of state transaction that she envisioned. Finally, 
as to other participants in illegal trades who have not yet been 
punished, the State has only limited resources to devote to any one 
case, and those resources were largely absorbed by the Johnsons' 
litigiousness. 
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unethical. As the Court correctly points out on page 16, the "if 
he finds" language in Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-6(1) (1989) 
gives the executive director great latitude in determining what 
constitutes "dishonest or unethical practices in the securities 
business." The Opinion never suggests that the executive 
director's discretion is absolute. The standard is one of 
reasonableness, and the Opinion's factual recitations set forth an 
ample basis for a finding that the Johnsons' actions were dishonest 
and unethical. Every fact finder who has looked at this case, from 
Judge Green, to Administrative Law Judge Eklund, to the Securities 
Advisory Board, to Division of Securities Director Baldwin, to 
Department of Commerce Executive Director Buhler, and finally to 
this Court, has come to the conclusion that far from being innocent 
victims of fraud, the Johnsons are clever actors who were 
chargeable with knowledge of the U.S.A. Medical fraud and who 
attempted to manipulate the system to their maximum benefit. As 
the Opinion so cogently puts it on page 17: 
It would be difficult to imagine a more willful violation 
of an order than that presented in this case. The 
Johnsons sought relief in federal district court, and 
when such relief was not forthcoming, they went to the 
Division of Securities to seek such relief. Having been 
granted the relief they sought from the Division, in the 
form of the stop trading order, they immediately turned 
around and began violating the very order for which in 
large part they were responsible. 
In short, it is impossible to read the Opinion (or, for that matter 
the full record in this case) and not understand that the decision 
to sanction the Johnsons for dishonest and unethical conduct was 
based upon ample evidence, and not the mere whim of the executive 
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director. 
The Conclusion portion of the Petition for Rehearing is mostly 
an attempt to resuscitate many of the arguments that the Opinion 
correctly labeled as being without merit. For example, the 
Johnsons insist on revisiting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-7920, 
and have even attached another copy of that Release to the 
Petition. The Respondents never addressed the release in either 
their brief or oral argument because they felt that it was 
unambiguously irrelevant to this case. Release No. 34-79209 states 
in part that 
It is the position of the [SEC] that where the broker or 
dealer is himself acting in good faith, where he is not 
connected with the activity announced by the Commission 
as a basis for suspension pursuant to Section 15(c)(5) or 
Section 19(a)(4), and where he has no reason to believe 
that his customer is so connected, no objection need be 
raised under such sections because the broker-dealer 
completes his contractual obligations in the particular 
transaction (e.g. by payment or delivery) while the 
suspension is still in effect. . . . 
A broker-dealer, in deciding whether to consummate 
such a transaction, must of course consider not only the 
provisions of Sections 15(c)(5) and (19)(a)(4) but also 
all other applicable provisions of the Federal securities 
laws. 
Putting aside the fact that the Johnsons cannot rely upon the 
Release because they were "connected with the activity" at issue, 
at least in Judge Green's view, it is clear that the Release only 
concerns itself with whether completing a contractual obligation by 
payment or delivery violates certain specific federal securities 
9Which, by the way, is nothing more than a statement by the 
SEC as to its policy in 1966, based on old law. By itself, the 
Release is not law, and it certainly is not binding on the Utah 
Division of Securities. 
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laws. If the Johnsons had both sold short and purchased the shares 
to cover the short sale before the stop trading order was in place, 
and if they were being sanctioned for merely finalizing delivery of 
already purchased securities, then the Release might be of some 
interest. The Releasef however, stops considerably short of saying 
that a broker-dealer may (and much less that a broker-dealer must) 
purchase stock10 in blatant violation of a state stop trading order 
simply so as to cover a short position created before the stop 
trading order went into effect. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Opinion should be amended so as to replace the references 
on page 8 to Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-12 with correct 
references to Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14(3). Otherwise, 
the Opinion is a correct and accurate statement of the law as it 
applies to this casef and it should not be modified. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of January, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID N. SONNENREICH 
Assistant Attorney General 
10While some argument could be made that the short sale was 
still open at the time of the stop trading order, and therefor 
could have been finalized by delivery under the terms of the 
Release, the purchase of new stock to cover the short sale was a 
separate transaction, and not merely the equivalent of payment or 
delivery. 
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